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1 . Introduction 
A bankruptcy problem is one that asks how to divide the estate of a 
bankrupt that fals short of the total of the claims of al creditors. Although 
the structure of the problem is very simple, there is a wide variety of 
solutions in the literature as presented by O’neil [7], Aumann and Maschler 
[1], Young [8], Curiel, Maschler and Tijs [2], etc. Among others, the 
proportional solution is the simplest and most prevailing in real-world 
bankruptcy proceedings. 
This may not be a surprising fact since proportionality is so widely 
accepted in many real-life situations. In the bankruptcy problem, there is a 
self-evident solution at least in the extreme case where the estate is just 
equal to the total of the claims. The proportional solution is one that 
divides the estate in the same proportion to the self-evident solution. But, 
why is such a method acceptable? 
The purpose of this paper is to give an answer to this question. 
*) The support from Minji Funso・ShoriKenkyu Kikin is greatly acknowledged. 
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This is equivalent to saying that we shall give axioms for the proportional 
solution, as provided by O’neil [7]. But, rather than imposing desirable 
properties on the solution,we seek to formulate a condition that would be 
acceptable in the process of compromise among individuals. For this 
purpose, we view the problem as a bargining problem due to Nash [6] and 
subsequent contributors. 
The bargaining game to be considered has a distinguished structure that 
the set of al strongly Pareto optimal allocations is almost always a 
hyperplane. No assumption ~s to the independence of utility-rescaling will 
be made. Therefore, although the proportional solution for some class of 
bankruptcy problems is precisely equal to the individually monotonic solution 
due to Kalai and Smorodinsky [ 4],the rationale is entirely different.明Te
need two axioms, one of which is the strong Pareto optimality. The other is 
concerned with the treatment of an increase in the estate. If the estate 
increases 100h% and if the original solution multiplied by h is feasible as a 
division of the increment under the same claims as the original ones, then 
we require that the original solution plus the h-times of it be also feasible 
as a division of the total estate. These two axioms are shown to be 
necessary and sufficient to obtain the proportional solution in our bargaining 
game. 
2 . The Bankruptcy Bargaining Solution 
Let N= {l，…n} be a finite set of agents, and let E be a positive real 
number and d=(d1，…dn) a positive n-vector. A bankruptcy problem is a pair 
(E;d) such that 
E豆D=LieN d，・
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To interpret, E is the estate of a bankrupt and d is a list of debts to the n 
creditors. E and d are measured in terms of money. Each creditor i 
advances his claim d;, but the total of the claims D exceeds the value E of 
the estate. How should then E be divided? 
Given a bankruptcy problem (E;d), let S(E;d). be the set in R" defined by 
S(E;d) = {xER"I ~ieN X；壬E,0孟X；話d;for each iEN} . 
S(E;d) is the set of feasible divisions of E with the assumption of free 
disposability of utility (money). The point 0=(0，…O)ES(E;d) represents the 
status quo, corresponding to the state just before the bankruptcy 
proceeding begins. Given S(E;d), creditors must seek to find a division on 
which they can compromise. If they cannot reach an agreement, no division 
can be carried out so that the status quo is the only outcome. With this 
interpretation in mind, we cal S(E;d) a bankruptcy bargaining game. 
Let I' be the set of al bankruptcy bargaining games. A solution is a 
function f：「→R"such that f(S(E;d）εS(E;d) for each S(E;d）εI'. The 
division f(S(E;d)) represents the outcome on which al the creditors 
compromise in the game S(E;d). 
羽Temake the following two assumptions on f. 
Axiom 1. For each S(E;d) E「， f(S(E;d))is strongly Pareto 
optimal , i. e., x孟f(S(E;d))and x E S(E;d)) implies 
x = f (S(E;d)). 
Axiom 2. For any S(E;d）εr and any real number h>O such that 
S((l + h)E;d)E I', hf(S(E;d）εS(hE;d) implies 
(1 + h)f(S(E;d))ES((l + h)E;d). 
Strong Pareto optimality is a standard assumption. It is consistent, in 
particular, in the game S(E;d) where E=D so that d itself is a natural 
-264-
solution. The latter axiom says that if the estate E is increased by hE while 
d remains fixed, and if the original solution multiplied by h is feasible as a 
division of the increment hE, then the original solution plus h-times of it 
should also be feasible as a division of E+ hE. 
We can now state our theorem. A solution f* is called proportional if 
f*(S(E;d)) = (E/D)d for each S(E;d)E r. 
Theorem. A solution f isproportional if and only if it satisfies 
axioms 1 and 2. 
Proof.羽Tefirst show the following lemma. 
L旦旦虫色 Underaxiom 2, if k>O and S(kE;d)E r, then 
kf(S(E;d）εS(kE;d). 
Proof. If O<k豆1,then the assertion follows from the definition of S(E;d). 
Take any k> 1 such that S(kE;d）εr. Then, k can be given by k= 1 ＋・・・
+ 1 +h, where Oくh豆1. Then, since hf(S(E;d))ES(hE;d), we have 
(1 + h)f(S(E;d)) ES((l + h)E;d). Now, putting h’＝1 +h, we have (1 +h’）f(S(E 
+d）巴S((l+ h’）E;d). Hence, repeating this procedure, we eventually have 
kf(S(E;d))ES(kE;d). This completes the proof of the lemma. 
Let f be any solution and let S(E;d）εr . Then, by axiom 1, 
(1) f(S(E;d）εP(E;d), 
where P(E;d) is the set of al strongly Pareto optimal points in S(E;d). 
Let k be defined by k = D /E孟1.Then S(kE;d)=S(D;d)E r. Hence, by 
axiom 2 and Lemma, we have (D/E)f(S(E;d）εS(D;d), or equivalently 
(2) f(S(E;d))E(E/D)S(D;d). 
Combining (2) with (1) we have 
f(S(E;d）εP(E;d) n (E/D)S(D;d) 
Hence, f(S(E;d))=(E/D)d. 
=P(E;d)n {xERnlO豆x豆（E/D)d}
= {(E/D)d} . 
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The converse is clear, and this completes the proof of the theorem. 
3 . Discussion 
Axiom 2 isan assumption as to how new feasible divisions are generated 
from the present division when the total amount available increases. A 
proportional increment can be added to the original division whenever the 
increment itself is a possible division of the increment in the estate. This 
assumption can be justified on the descriptive basis. It describes a rule in 
the bargaining process, rather than a judgement of an arbitrator. The 
proportional division is the only acceptable one that is consistent with this 
rule for any possible increment in the estate. 
A related assumption on a bargaining process is the following additivity: 
S(E;d)Ef', E=E1+E2, E1>0 and E2>0 imply f(S(E;d))=f(S(E1;d))+f(S(E2; 
d). Clearly, f* satisfies the additivity. Moulin [5] introduced the additivity in 
the surplus-sharing problem, and remarked that the proportional solution to 
the bankruptcy problem (E;d) can be characterized by the additivity alone. 
We could also derive the proportional solution from the additivity if we 
endow [' with the Hausdorff metric to obtain continuity, and then use the 
theorem in functional equations to obtain proportionality from additivity. 
Another related axiom is the one corresponding to what Young [8] called 
path由independence:S(E’；d)E [' , S(E;d）ε［＇ ' E’＞E and [S(E’：d）イ（S(E;d))]
nR＋＋手ゆ implyf(S(E’；d))=f(S(E;d))+f([S(E’；d）イ（S(E;d))]n R++). Note that 
this axiom is weaker than the additivity which requires f([S(E’；d）イ（S(E;d))]
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n R++)=f(S(E' -E;d)). Also, this is a weaker form of the step-by-step 
negotiation axiom introduced by Kalai [3]. The proportional solution f* 
satisfies the axiom, but it seems too weak to single out f*. 
It is of some interest to see whether the proportional solution f * is
consistent with other axioms known in the bargaining theory. First of al, it 
does not satisfy the axiom of monotonicity: S(E’；d）εr, S(E;d)Er' E’孟E
and d’孟dimply f(S(E’；d）孟f(S(E;d)).This may be seen from the fact that 
any strongly Pareto optimal point in S(E;d) other than f (S(E;d)) is a solution 
to some S(E;d’） where Z副 d’i=Eand d’豆d.This is the source of the 
apparent difference between our solution and the proportional solution 
defined by Kalai [3]. It is also evident that f* does not satisfy the axiom of 
independence of irrelevant alternatives: S(E' ;d’）εr' S(E;d)Er' E’丞E,
d’孟d and f(S(E’；d’）εS(E;d) imply f(S(E’；d’）＝f(S(E;d)). On the other 
hand, f* satisfies the axiom of individual monotonicity: S(E’；d’）εr, 
S(E;d）ε「，E’孟E,and for some i EN, d’i孟di,d’i=di for al j:f=i imply 
(f[S(E’；dm孟（f[S(E;dm・Infact, f* coincides with the individually monotonic 
solution defined by Kalai and Smorodinsky [ 4]on r’＝ {S(E;d）εr ldi豆E
for al iEK} . Notice that the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is well-defined on 
r ’for any finite n. However, due to the inherent nature of the bankruptcy 
problem that the strong Pareto surface is almost always a hyperplane, the 
individual monotonicity loses its power in deriving the proportional solution. 
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